Floridi L. The philosophy of information (Oxford, 2011). - ОГЛАВЛЕНИЕ / CONTENTS
Навигация

Архив выставки новых поступлений | Отечественные поступления | Иностранные поступления | Сиглы
ОбложкаFloridi L. The philosophy of information. - Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. - xviii, 405 p.: ill. - Ref.: p.372-399. - Ind.: p.401-405. - ISBN 978-0-19-913239-0
 

Оглавление / Contents
 
Preface ....................................................... xii
Acknowledgements ............................................... xv
List of figures .............................................. xvii
List of tables ................................................ xix
List of most common acronyms ................................... xx

Chapter 1  What is the philosophy of information? ............... 1
Summary ......................................................... 1
1.1  Introduction ............................................... 1
1.2  Philosophy of artificial intelligence as a premature
     paradigm of PI ............................................. 2
1.3  The historical emergence of PI ............................. 5
1.4  The dialectic of reflection and the emergence of PI ........ 7
1.5  The definition of PI ...................................... 13
1.6  The analytic approach to PI ............................... 17
1.7  The metaphysical approach to PI ........................... 19
1.8  PI as philosophia prima ................................... 24
Conclusion ..................................................... 25

Chapter 2  Open problems in the philosophy of information ...... 26
Summary ........................................................ 26
2.1  Introduction .............................................. 26
2.2  David Hilbert's view ...................................... 28
2.3  Analysis .................................................. 30
2.4  Semantics ................................................. 33
2.5  Intelligence .............................................. 35
2.6  Nature .................................................... 42
2.7  Values .................................................... 44
Conclusion ..................................................... 45

Chapter 3  The method of levels of abstraction ................. 46
Summary ........................................................ 46
3.1  Introduction .............................................. 47
3.2  Some definitions and preliminary examples ................. 48
3.3  A classic interpretation of the method of abstraction ..... 58
3.4  Some philosophical applications ........................... 60
3.5  The philosophy of the method of abstraction ............... 68
Conclusion ..................................................... 78

Chapter 4  Semantic information and the veridicality thesis .... 80
Summary ........................................................ 80
4.1  Introduction .............................................. 80
4.2  The data-based approach to semantic information ........... 82
4.3  The general definition of information ..................... 83
4.4  Understanding data ........................................ 85
4.5  Taxonomic neutrality ...................................... 86
4.6  Typological neutrality .................................... 87
4.7  Ontological neutrality .................................... 90
4.8  Genetic neutrality ........................................ 91
4.9  Alethic neutrality ........................................ 92
4.10 Why false information is not a kind of semantic
     information ............................................... 93
4.11 Why false information is pseudo-information: Attributive
     vs predicative use ........................................ 97
4.12 Why false information is pseudo-information: 
     A semantic argument ....................................... 98
4.13 The definition of semantic information ................... 104
Conclusion .................................................... 106

Chapter 5  Outline of a theory of strongly semantic 
information ................................................... 108
Summary ....................................................... 108
5.1  Introduction ............................................. 109
5.2  The Bar-Hillel-Carnap Paradox ............................ 111
5.3  Three criteria of information equivalence ................ 114
5.4  Three desiderata for TSSI ................................ 117
5.5  Degrees of vacuity and inaccuracy ........................ 117
5.6  Degrees of informativeness ............................... 123
5.7  Quantities of vacuity and of semantic information ........ 125
5.8  The solution of the Bar-Hillel-Carnap Paradox ............ 127
5.9  TSSI and the scandal of deduction ........................ 129
Conclusion .................................................... 132

Chapter 6  The symbol grounding problem ....................... 134
Summary ....................................................... 134
6.1  Introduction ............................................. 134
6.2  The symbol grounding problem ............................. 136
6.3  The representationalist approach ......................... 137
6.4  The semi-representationalist approach .................... 149
for the solution of the SGP ................................... 153
6.5  The non-representationalist approach ..................... 155
Conclusion .................................................... 160

Chapter 7  Action-based semantics ............................. 162
Summary ....................................................... 162
7.1  Introduction ............................................. 162
7.2  Action-based Semantics ................................... 164
7.3  Two-machine artificial agents and their AbS .............. 166
7.4  From grounded symbols to grounded communication and
     abstractions ............................................. 176
Conclusion .................................................... 179

Chapter 8  Semantic information and the correctness theory
of truth ...................................................... 182
Summary ....................................................... 182
8.1  Introduction ............................................. 183
8.2  First step: Translation .................................. 186
8.3  Second step: Polarization ................................ 188
8.4  Third step: Normalization ................................ 190
8.5  Fourth step: Verification and validation ................. 193
8.6  Fifth step: Correctness .................................. 195
8.7  Some implications and advantages of the correctness
     theory of truth .......................................... 199
Conclusion .................................................... 208

Chapter 9  The logical unsolvability of the Gettier problem ... 209
Summary ....................................................... 209
9.1  Introduction ............................................. 210
9.2  Why the Gettier problem is unsolvable in principle ....... 212
9.3  Three objections and replies ............................. 217
Conclusion .................................................... 222

Chapter 10 The logic of being informed ........................ 224
Summary ....................................................... 224
10.1 Introduction ............................................. 224
10.2 Three logics of information .............................. 226
10.3 Modelling 'being informed' ............................... 228
Conclusion .................................................... 243

Chapter 11 Understanding epistemic relevance .................. 244
Summary ....................................................... 244
11.1 Introduction ............................................. 245
11.2 Epistemic vs causal relevance ............................ 246
11.3 The basic case ........................................... 249
11.6 A metatheoretical revision of the counterfactual 
     analysis ................................................. 254
11.7 Advantages of the metatheoretical revision ............... 256
11.8 Some illustrative cases .................................. 257
11.9 Misinformation cannot be relevant ........................ 260
11.10 Two objections and replies .............................. 261
Conclusion .................................................... 265

Chapter 12 Semantic information and the network theory of
account ....................................................... 267
Summary ....................................................... 267
12.1 Introduction ............................................. 268
12.2 The nature of the upgrading problem: Mutual 
     independence ............................................. 268
12.3 Solving the upgrading problem: The network theory of 
     account .................................................. 274
12.4 Advantages of a network theory of account ................ 279
12.5 Testing the network theory of account .................... 284
Conclusion .................................................... 288

Chapter 13 Consciousness, agents, and the knowledge game ...... 290
Summary ....................................................... 290
13.1 Introduction ............................................. 290
13.2 The knowledge game ....................................... 296
13.3 The first and classic version of the knowledge game:
     Externally inferable states .............................. 297
13.4 The second version of the knowledge game ................. 301
13.5 The third version of the knowledge game .................. 302
13.6 The fourth version of the knowledge game ................. 307
13.7 Dretske's question and the knowledge game ................ 309
Conclusion .................................................... 313

Chapter 14 Against digital ontology ........................... 316
Summary ....................................................... 316
14.1 Introduction ............................................. 316
14.2 What is digital ontology? It from Bit .................... 317
14.3 The thought experiment ................................... 325
14.4 Three objections and replies ............................. 334
Conclusion .................................................... 337

Chapter 15 A defence of informational structural realism ...... 339
Summary ....................................................... 339
15.1 Introduction ............................................. 340
15.2 First step: ESR and OSR are not incompatible ............. 344
15.3 Second step: Relata are not logically prior to all 
     relations ................................................ 353
15.4 Third step: The concept of a structural object is not
     empty .................................................... 355
15.5 Informational structural realism ......................... 360
15.6 Ten objections and replies ............................... 361
Conclusion .................................................... 369

References .................................................... 372
Index ......................................................... 401


Архив выставки новых поступлений | Отечественные поступления | Иностранные поступления | Сиглы
 

[О библиотеке | Академгородок | Новости | Выставки | Ресурсы | Библиография | Партнеры | ИнфоЛоция | Поиск]
  © 1997–2024 Отделение ГПНТБ СО РАН  

Документ изменен: Wed Feb 27 14:24:50 2019. Размер: 14,660 bytes.
Посещение N 1222 c 23.07.2013